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Abstract
In this chapter we present a selective analytic survey of some of the main results of trade under
oligopoly. We concentrate on three topics: oligopoly as an independent determinant of trade, as
illustrated by the reciprocal-markets model of Brander (1981); oligopoly as an independent rationale
for government intervention, as illustrated by strategic trade and industrial policy in the third-market
model of Spencer and Brander (1983); and the challenges and potential of embedding trade under
oligopoly in general equilibrium as illustrated by the GOLE model of Neary (2002).
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1 Introduction
Oligopoly means competition among the few, and the study of markets with a relatively small number
of large rms is an important branch of industrial organisation and microeconomics more generally.
However, it plays a smaller role in the theory of international trade. From its inception in the work of
Ricardo in 1817 until the 1980s, trade theory was dominated by perfectly competitive models. What
is sometimes called the new trade theory revolution from 1979 onwards led to a surge of interest
in the implications for trade of imperfectly competitive models.1 Since then, two di¤erent routes to
incorporating imperfect competition into trade theory have been explored, so di¤erent that the process
could be described as two revolutions rather than one. On the one hand, monopolistically competitive
models of large-group competition have been applied to the study of intra-industry trade and a host of
other topics; on the other hand, oligopolistic models have been applied to both positive and normative
questions. Of these two, monopolistic competition quickly became the preferred approach, so much so
that, in the words of Paul Krugman, it could be said that there are now Two and a Half Theories
of Trade, with the theory of oligopoly a poor relation of the two dominant paradigms, perfect and
monopolistic competition.2
However, despite their dominance, there are many issues in trade which the theories of perfect and
monopolistic competition are inherently ill-tted to address. The assumptions which they share, of an
innitely elastic supply of atomistic rms, that are ex ante identical and do not engage in strategic
interaction, are not obviously appropriate to many global markets. Casual empiricism suggests that
many industries are dominated by a small number of rms, and an increasing body of applied work
shows that large rms account for a dominant share of exports as well as foreign direct investment and
spending on research and development.3 By contrast, the theory of oligopoly is suited to study the
distinctive features of concentrated industries, and in particular, the persistence of prots, as well as
strategic behaviour by rms and governments to preserve and enhance these prots.
In this survey, we present an analytic overview of some of the main theoretical results of trade under
oligopoly. Following Brander (1995), we concentrate on two canonical models. Section 2 considers the
reciprocal-marketsmodel, which has been used to analyse a variety of positive and normative questions
in cases where both domestic and foreign rms compete both at home and away. Most notable among
these was the demonstration by Brander (1981) that oligopolistic competition is an independent source
of trade, and in particular of intra-industry trade, distinct from either comparative advantage or product
di¤erentiation. Section 3 turns to consider issues of strategictrade and industrial policy in models of
multi-stage competition, which are most easily studied in the third-marketmodel rst developed by
Spencer and Brander (1983). Finally, Section 4 turns to consider the objection that oligopoly models
1See Krugman (1979) for an early contribution, and Neary (2009) for an overview and further references.
2See Neary (2010) for further discussion.
3See Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007) and Mayer and Ottaviano (2007).
have not been embedded in general equilibrium, and reviews some recent work which tries to overcome
this.
2 Trade under Oligopoly
2.1 The Reciprocal-MarketsModel
The reciprocal-markets model is a simple framework for studying trade under oligopoly, which has
the convenient property that it is possible to study each countrys market in isolation. An essential
assumption which makes this possible is that national markets are segmented. On the one hand, this
implies that third-party arbitrage is not possible, so a rms output can command di¤erent equilibrium
prices in di¤erent countries. On the other hand, it implies that rms make distinct output or price
decisions for each market. The latter is not a primitive assumption, and Venables (1990) and Ben-Zvi
and Helpman (1992) have explored the conditions under which it will emerge as an equilibrium outcome
of a multi-stage game where rms rst invest in their worldwide capacity and then decide on prices and/or
sales volumes for each market. Such models have the attractive feature that rms decide endogenously
how to supply di¤erent markets, but their greater complexity has limited their appeal. As a result, most
of the literature has continued to adopt the segmented markets assumption and we follow that approach
here.4
In addition to market segmentation, the ability to consider one market in isolation requires that
rms produce under constant marginal costs. Otherwise, output or price decisions in one market have
implications for the costs at which other markets can be served. A rare example of a model with such cost
linkages between markets is provided by Krugman (1984). He assumes falling marginal costs and shows
that an import protection policy that raises a rms home sales also increases that rms market share in
its export market. Here, by contrast, we will follow most of the literature and assume that marginal costs
are independent of scale. The combination of this and the assumption of segmented markets implies that
changes in policy or other exogenous variables in one market have no e¤ect on the other market.
Armed with these assumptions, we can now explore the properties of a canonical reciprocal-markets
model, rst presented by Brander (1981). Consider a single oligopolistic industry, the output of which
is consumed in two countries, labelled home and foreign. The rms competing in this industry are also
from the home and foreign country, with just one rm in each.5 We conne attention to the symmetric
case, where the home and foreign rms have the same marginal cost of production c and face the same
trade cost t. For most of the discussion the trade costs are assumed to reect natural barriers to trade,
though we note on occasions where tari¤s have di¤erent implications. Without loss of generality we will
4Empirical studies by Goldberg and Verboven (2001) and others document an apparently high degree of market seg-
mentation in oligopolistic industries.
5Bernhofen (1999) extends the basic duopoly model to allow for more home and foreign rms.
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restrict attention to the home market, where the sales of the home and foreign rms are denoted x and
y respectively. Because of symmetry, foreign market sales of the home and foreign rms are also equal
to y and x respectively.
Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) used the reciprocal-markets model to consider
multilateral trade liberalisation between two identical countries under Cournot competition with identical
goods. They demonstrated that under Cournot competition intra-industry trade can occur in equilibrium
even when goods are identical, and they showed that welfare is U-shaped in transport costs. In the next
subsection we will illustrate their results in a more general setup that allows for product di¤erentiation.6
Then, in Section 2.3, we will illustrate the corresponding results under Bertrand competition that were
rst derived by Clarke and Collie (2003). Finally, in Section 2.4, we extend the analysis to repeated
interaction between rms, and explore how trade liberalisation a¤ects the incentives for rms to collude.
Throughout this section, we use a simple common specication of preferences and technology to obtain
explicit solutions and to allow us to compare the results under Cournot and Bertrand competition. On
the demand side we assume that preferences are quadratic; the qualitative results continue to hold for
more general specications. Thus the domestic utility from consumption of the oligopolistic goods is
represented by the following:7
u = a(x+ y)  1
2
b(x2 + 2exy + y2): (1)
where e is an inverse measure of the degree of product di¤erentiation, ranging from the case of perfect
substitutes (e = 1) to that of independent demands (e = 0). This yields linear inverse demand functions:
p = a  b(x+ ey); (2)
p = a  b(ex+ y); (3)
where p and p are the prices of the home and foreign varieties respectively. On the cost side, we assume
that marginal costs are constant and we ignore xed costs. Hence the home and foreign rmsoperating
prots in the home market are:
 = (p  c)x (4)
 = (p  c   t)y (5)
where c and c are the marginal production costs of the home and foreign rms, assumed to be indepen-
6Bernhofen (2001) introduced product di¤erentiation into Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly models of intra-industry
trade, focusing on the e¤ect of trade on prots and consumer surplus.
7This ignores the utility derived from other goods. One justication for this specication is that u is a sub-utility
function where the upper-tier utility function is quasi-linear. See Section 4 for further discussion.
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dent of output, and t is the per-unit cost of international transportation.
2.2 Quantity Competition
We will rst consider the output e¤ects of symmetric multilateral trade liberalisation between two iden-
tical countries under quantity competition. As the countries are mirror images of each other we need
only consider the e¤ect of a transport cost reduction on equilibrium in the home market. Using the
linear inverse demand functions (2) and (3), the rmsrst-order conditions for output are bx = p   c
and by = p   c  t: These can then be solved for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs:
x =
1
b(2 + e)

a  c+ e
2  et

(6)
y =
1
b(2 + e)

a  c  2
2  et

(7)
At free trade (t = 0), imports y equal the home rms sales x, giving the rst result of the model:
oligopolistic competition is an independent determinant of trade. Most remarkably, this is true even
when products are identical (e = 1), the case of cross-haulingor two-way trade in identical products
in the words of Brander (1981). As goods become more di¤erentiated, e falls below one and the volume
of trade rises further: consumerslove of variety is a second source of intra-industry trade, though in this
model it is a less important one than oligopolistic competition.8
As trade costs increase, cross-hauling persists, though at a diminishing level: home sales rise and
imports fall. They nally reach zero at the prohibitive level of trade costs btC , which from (7) equals:
btC = 2  e
2
(a  c) (8)
For any level of trade costs between zero and btC , and any degree of product di¤erentiation e, each rm
is selling more in its home market than abroad, because it faces a cost penalty on its foreign sales. As a
result, the prices it obtains in equilibrium yield a lower mark-up over cost on its exports than on its home
sales. This is the second key result of the model, which Brander and Krugman (1983) called reciprocal
dumping. Because the two markets are symmetric, the dumping margin, the di¤erence between the
prices obtained by each rm in its home and foreign markets (where the latter equals the f.o.b. - free on
8We can attribute to oligopolistic competition alone the amount of trade which would occur in the absence of trade
barriers if goods were identical: when e = 1, y = a c
3b
. The remainder of trade, a c
b(2+e)
  a c
3b
, is due to product
di¤erentiation, so the share of trade attributable to product di¤erentiation rather than to oligopolistic competition is 1 e
3
.
This rises from zero (when e = 1) to one third (when e = 0) as products become more di¤erentiated. This contrasts
with models of monopolistic competition under CES preferences, in which the share of intra-industry trade in total trade
is independent of the degree of product di¤erentiation. This empirically implausible prediction was rst pointed out by
Ethier (1982a, Proposition 12). See Bernhofen (2001) for further discussion.
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board - price, i.e., the price net of trade costs), equals:
p  (p   t) = 1
2  et (9)
This is increasing in both t and e: dumping is more pronounced the higher are trade costs and the greater
the substitutability between goods.9
It is natural to consider the implications of this kind of trade for welfare, but a useful preliminary
step, which is also of independent interest, is its implications for prots. Focusing on the home rm,
its total prots equal the sum of its prots on home sales and on exports. The rst are given by (4)
while the second equal the foreign rms prots in the home market (5), because of the symmetry of the
model. Substituting in turn from the rst-order conditions, these are proportional to home and export
sales respectively:  = bx2 and  = by2. Di¤erentiating (6) and (7), the e¤ect of a multilateral change
in trade costs on total prots can be shown to equal:
d ( + )
dt
= 2bx
dx
dt
+ 2by
dy
dt
=
2e
4  e2x 
4
4  e2 y
8><>: < 0 when t = 0 (so x = y)> 0 when t = btC (so y = 0) (10)
The key nding is that prots are decreasing in trade costs at free trade, but increasing in them in the
neighbourhood of autarky. With linear demands, it follows that prots must be a U-shaped function of
trade costs, reaching their maximum in autarky and their minimum above free trade. The intuition for
this is straightforward. First, starting from free trade, exports are harmed more by an increase in the
rms own costs than home sales are helped by an equal rise in its rivals costs; hence total sales and
prots fall for a small increase in t at free trade. Second, starting from autarky, exports are initially zero,
so a small fall in trade costs has a negligible e¤ect on prots in the export market. By contrast, home
sales are initially at the monopoly level, so a small fall in the foreign rms trade costs has a rst-order
e¤ect on home-market prots. Hence, overall prots fall for a small reduction in t at autarky.
Finally, we can consider the e¤ect of changes in trade costs on welfare. Home welfare equals:
W = + (11)
where  is home consumer surplus and  =  +  are the prots of the home rm in both markets.
Once again, since we are assuming symmetric trade liberalisation between identical countries, we can
make use of the fact that the prots of the home rm in the foreign market are equal to the prots of
the foreign rm in the home market.
Consider in turn the components of welfare in (11). Consumer surplus must rise monotonically as
trade costs fall. This is because a reduction in trade costs lowers the prices of both goods to home
9Article VI of the GATT permits the imposition of an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin given
in (9).
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consumers.10 To this must be added the U-shaped relationship between prots and trade costs already
derived. In the neighbourhood of free trade, welfare is clearly falling in trade costs. All that is left
is to consider the sum of consumer surplus and prots for a small fall in t starting in autarky (where
t = t^C). Consumer surplus rises because the price falls, but prots on home sales fall both because the
price falls and because sales are reduced. The price e¤ects cancel, so the total fall in prots outweighs
the rise in consumer surplus.11 Thus home welfare (the sum of prots and consumer surplus) is also a
U-shaped function of t, reaching its maximum at free trade but its minimum below the prohibitive level
of tari¤s, as shown by the curve labelled WC in Figure 1. An alternative intuitive explanation for this
is that a fall in trade costs from the prohibitive level leads to a procompetitive increase in sales, helping
to undo the monopoly distortion; however, it also brings about trade at very high transport costs, which
is wasteful. In the neighbourhood of the prohibitive trade cost the latter e¤ect dominates, but at lower
trade costs the procompetitive e¤ect is dominant. Note nally that this argument does not apply to
tari¤s, at least when tari¤ revenue is fully reimbursed to consumers. In that case, the trade costs are
merely a transfer payment, and so the procompetitive e¤ect dominates at all levels of tari¤s, and welfare
falls monotonically as tari¤s rise.12
2.3 Price Competition
How are the e¤ects of trade liberalisation on trade and welfare a¤ected if rms compete in price rather
than quantity? A rst issue to be addressed is that the outcome of price competition is fundamentally
di¤erent from that of quantity competition when home and foreign goods are perfect substitutes (e = 1).
This feature is not peculiar to a trading economy, but rather a reection of the highly competitive nature
of price competition in this case. In a closed-economy duopoly, the lowest-cost rm captures the whole
market. In an open economy, even an innitesimal trade cost ensures that no trade occurs. Hence,
the key prediction of the Cournot model, cross-hauling of identical goods, does not apply when rms
compete on price and goods are identical.13 However, the other prediction, that trade liberalisation
has a competition e¤ect, applies even more strongly. Even though no actual trade may take place in
equilibrium, the head-to-head competition between rival rms prevents either of them charging a price
greater than their rivals marginal cost inclusive of the trade cost.
The case of price competition with perfect substitutes is an extreme one. By contrast, there is much
10This is intuitively obvious, and easily proved using the rst-order conditions and the expressions for output (6) and
(7). These yield: dp
dt
=
d(bx)
dt
= e
4 e2 > 0 and
dp
dt
= 1 +
d(by)
dt
= 2 e
2
4 e2 > 0.
11With consumer surplus denoted by  = u (x; y)   px   py, the change in consumer surplus is d =  xdp   ydp,
which equals  xdp in the neighbourhood of autarky where imports y are zero. Prots on exports are also zero in the
neighbourhood of autarky. As for prots on home sales,  = (p  c)x, the change in this is d = (p  c) dx+ xdp. In the
neighborhood of autarky, d+ d = (p  c) dx which is negative as the tari¤ falls.
12This qualies the statement made in Neary (2009), p. 242, footnote 25.
13Strictly speaking, this is only true for positive trade costs. Cross-hauling can occur when goods are identical (e = 1)
and trade is unrestricted (t = 0), although the volume of trade is indeterminate without additional assumptions. One
natural case is where consumers buy rst from their home rm, so trade is zero even with no trade costs. An alternative
case is where consumers are indi¤erent and purchase half and half from each rm, so cross-hauling constitutes a high
proportion of trade.
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greater similarity between price and quantity competition in the more plausible case where goods are
imperfect substitutes. To solve for the Bertrand equilibrium in this case, we need to use the direct
demand functions, which can be obtained by inverting the system in (2) and (3):
x =
1
b (1  e2) [(1  e)a  (p  ep
)] (12)
y =
1
b (1  e2) [(1  e)a  (p
   ep)] (13)
For the moment consider only interior equilibria in which both rms export positive quantities. We
will return to corner solutions later. The rst-order conditions for the optimal choice of prices are
p  c = b(1  e2)x for the home rm and p  c  t = b(1  e2)y for the foreign rm. These can be solved
for the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices:
p =
(1  e)a+ c
2  e +
e
4  e2 t (14)
p =
(1  e)a+ c
2  e +
2
4  e2 t (15)
These in turn can be combined with the direct demand functions to obtain the equilibrium quantities
under Bertrand competition:
x =
1
b(1 + e)(2  e)

a  c+ e
(1  e)(2 + e) t

(16)
y =
1
b(1 + e)(2  e)

a  c  2  e
2
(1  e)(2 + e) t

(17)
As in the Cournot case, imports equal the home rms sales at free trade and are decreasing in trade
costs, falling to zero when trade costs reach the threshold level which sets (17) equal to zero:
btB = (1  e)(2 + e)
2  e2 (a  c) (18)
For trade costs strictly between zero and btB , and any value of e less than one, there is reciprocal dumping
just as in Cournot competition. In this case the dumping margin equals:
p  (p   t) = 1 + e
2 + e
t (19)
This is lower than in the Cournot case, provided e is strictly positive, reecting the more competitive
nature of price competition; and, as in the Cournot case, it is increasing in both e and t.
Prots and welfare also behave quite similarly to quantity competition for trade costs between zero
and btB . Using the rst-order conditions for prices, maximised prots are equal to b(1   e2)x2 and
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b(1   e2)y2. Total prots for the home rm are then equal to the sum of these, and their behaviour as
trade costs change can be shown to equal:
d ( + )
dt
= 2b(1  e2)

x
dx
dt
+ y
dy
dt

/ ex   2  e2 y
8><>: < 0 when t = 0 (so x = y)> 0 when t = btB (so y = 0) (20)
Once again, therefore, prots are a U-shaped function of trade costs. This in turn, combined with the
fact that consumer surplus is monotonically decreasing in trade costs, implies that welfare is U-shaped
in t, for the same reasons as in the Cournot case.
However, unlike under Cournot competition this is not the end of the story. Even when trade costs are
too high for exports to take place, they may not be too high to prevent the threat of exports from a¤ecting
domestic rmsbehaviour. Recall from (18) that btB is the prohibitive level of trade costs under Bertrand
competition. Substituting this into (16) shows that the home rms output is x = (a c)=b(2 e2) at this
level of trade costs, which is above the unconstrained monopoly output level, xM = (a  c)=2b. However,
the home rm does not have an incentive to raise its price, since its rival would then make positive sales,
so lowering the home rms prots.14 In this sense, we can describe the equilibrium as one where the
home rm is constrained by the threat of potential competition. As the trade costs rise further the home
rm has greater scope to raise its price. Only when trade costs reach the prohibitive level under Cournot
competition, as given by (8) in section 2.2, can the home rm behave as an unconstrained monopolist.
At intermediate levels of trade costs, btB  t  btC , the home rm chooses a price at which the foreign
rm is just unable to produce. In this region the home rms output is:15
x =
a  c  t
be
(21)
which is clearly falling in t: Combining this with (16), which applies in the region 0  t  btB , home sales
are an inverted-V function of trade costs.
Finally, consider the level of welfare in this region of potential though not actual competition from
imports. Welfare in the absence of trade is consumer surplus plus home prots. This can be written as
W = (a  c)x  12bx2. Totally di¤erentiate this to get:
dW = (a  c  bx)dx: (22)
It is then clear from (21) and (22) that welfare is falling in trade costs in the region btB  t  btC . Hence,
unlike the Cournot case, under Bertrand competition trade liberalisation starting from autarky initially
14For further details see Clarke and Collie (2003).
15To see this, nd the level of p that sets imports equal to zero for any given p. From (13) with y = 0, this is:
p =
p (1 e)a
e
: In this region, with btB  t  btC , the foreign rm is just kept out of the market so the incipient price
of imports is simply their unit cost: p = c + t. Eliminating prices p and p from these two equations and the demand
function p = a  bx yields (21).
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raises welfare: the home rm is disciplined by the threat of trade, without any trade taking place, and
hence without any socially wasteful transport costs being incurred.16
The locus labelledWB in Figure 1 summarises the relationship between welfare and the level of trade
costs under Bertrand competition. (The gure is drawn for an intermediate value of the substitution
parameter e; 0.8 in this case.) Welfare in autarky is at the monopoly level, where the mode of competition
with the foreign rm is irrelevant, so WB and WC coincide. As t falls (moving to the left away from btC),
the home rms prot-maximising strategy is to lower its price thereby raising output and welfare even
though no imports actually occur. Below the threshold level btB , imports become protable, and have
the same e¤ect as in Cournot competition, generating a U-shaped relationship between welfare and t.
However, as shown by Clarke and Collie (2003), the level of welfare never falls below the autarky level.
So, while trade liberalisation may lower welfare in a local sense, opening up to trade can never induce
net losses from trade as in the Cournot case.
To summarise the Bertrand case, it di¤ers from Cournot in that the key prediction of cross-hauling
of identical goods no longer applies. On the other hand, the other main nding, that trade imposes
a competition e¤ect, is enhanced rather than weakened. Even if no trade actually occurs, it may still
induce more competitive behaviour by the domestic rm, so raising welfare. As trade costs fall further,
actual imports occur, and welfare is a U-shaped function of trade costs as in the Cournot case. However,
the level of welfare never falls below the autarky level: in this respect too, the competition e¤ect of trade
is stronger under Bertrand competition than under Cournot.
2.4 Repeated Interaction and Collusion
So far we have shown that once trade costs fall below some critical level rms will invade each others
markets. However, the increased competition between the rms will reduce their prots. Could rms
decide to collude by refraining from exporting to each others market? Clearly such a collusive arrange-
ment will not be possible to sustain in a one-shot non-cooperative game setting. However, it has been
shown by several authors that if the game is repeated innitely then whether or not such a collusive
arrangement can be sustained will depend on the degree of impatience of the rms.17
Both the quantity setting and the price setting games we have examined above have a prisoners
dilemma character, in the sense that the rms would collectively do better if they could collude and
share the markets, but they have a unilateral incentive to deviate from such an agreement. Assume
that the game is repeated innitely and that the rms have an identical discount factor . If a rm
deviates from collusion (cheats) it will be punished in the future. We will follow most of this literature
and assume that if a rm cheats its rival will never again cooperate with it. This is a so-called grim
16This equilibrium resembles those with explicit entry-deterrence behaviour, as in Dixit (1980) or Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984). However, unlike those cases, here the rms move simultaneously in a one-shot game.
17See for instance Pinto (1986), Fung (1991, 1992), Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) and Ashournia, Hansen and Hansen
(2008).
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trigger strategyand it implies that a period of cheating is followed by reversion to the Nash equilibrium
in each period forever after.
Given that its rival chooses the collusive action, a rm must weigh the one-period gain from cheating
against the lower prots in all subsequent periods in the future. The less impatient are rms, the less
valuable will be the short-term gains from cheating and the more they will be concerned with the loss
of prots in the innite punishment phase. There is a critical threshold discount factor b, above which
collusion can be sustained. This critical discount factor depends (among other things) on the level of
trade costs. Tacit collusion supported by grim trigger strategies is possible for any discount rate  above
the threshold level, which is dened by:
b  D   J
D   N (23)
where J is per-period prot for a rm when both rms collude (i.e., engage in joint prot maximization),
N is per-period prot for a rm under non-cooperation, and D is the one-period prot of defecting
from the collusive agreement when the rival keeps to the tacit agreement. The ranking of these per-period
prots is: D > J > N :
The simplest special case is that of Cournot competition with identical products. In this case, rst
studied by Pinto (1986), collusion implies that the rms do not export and behave as monopolists in their
own markets. If collusion breaks down, the rms play Cournot in both markets, just as in Section 2.2.
A reduction in t increases D, the short-run protability of defecting from the collusive agreement. This
is because the gains from invading the rivals market are larger the lower are trade costs. A fall in t also
inuences a rms prots in the punishment phase N . However the e¤ect is small relative to the e¤ect
on D and it is non-monotonic. As we saw in Section 2.2 (see equation (20)), this non-monotonicity arises
from the fact that a reduction in trade costs raises prots on export sales but increases competition from
the rival in the home market. With homogeneous-product quantity-setting rms, the increased short-run
protability of the cheating dominates. Hence, trade liberalization increases b and thus reduces the range
of  over which collusion can occur and so has an unambiguously pro-competitive e¤ect.
The unambiguously benecial e¤ect of trade liberalization on competition has recently been chal-
lenged by Ashournia, Hansen and Hansen (2008) who show that this result is sensitive to the assumption
of identical products.18 Following earlier work by Fung (1991) they show that colluding rms will not
in general refrain from entering each othershome markets. Given a taste for variety on the part of
consumers and provided that transport costs are not too high, the prots of the cartel can be increased
by selling both of the di¤erent varieties in the two markets. The collusive outputs in the home market
are:
18Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) demonstrate that this result is also reversed under Bertrand competition with homo-
geneous products.
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bx =
(1  e)(a  c) + et
2(1  e2) ; and by =
(1  e)(a  c)  t
2(1  e2) (24)
Hence there is intra-industry trade in a collusive equilibrium provided that t < btT  (1  e)(a  c). This
threshold is below the prohibitive trade cost under Cournot given in (8). When trade costs are below btT
so that trade occurs under collusion, then a lowering of trade costs will lower the critical threshold level
of the discount factor thus making collusion easier. The intuition for this surprising result is that trade
liberalisation raises rmsprotability in the presence of collusive trade while it leaves prots unchanged
when rms do not trade under collusion. Thus when there is trade under collusion there is an additional
reason why trade liberalisation strengthens the incentive to cooperate. This is su¢ cient to make trade
liberalisation anti-competitive in the presence of collusive trade.19
3 Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy
3.1 A General Strategic Trade Model
In their seminal paper on strategic trade policy Brander and Spencer (1985) developed a model in which
it is optimal to subsidize exports. They consider an oligopolistic setting in which pure prots are earned
in equilibrium, and an export subsidy can be used to shift these rents from foreigners to home residents.
In their model Brander and Spencer assume that the rms play Cournot and that quantities are
strategic substitutes, so that the rmsreaction functions are negatively sloped. However, it was soon
demonstrated that the strategic trade argument for an export subsidy is very sensitive to changes in
these key assumptions. Eaton and Grossman (1986) showed that when rms compete in a Bertrand
manner and prices are strategic complements then an export tax is optimal.20 We will now present these
contrasting results using the unifying framework of a general strategic trade model that allows for both
quantity and price competition. This is a slightly modied version of a model rst presented by Brander
(1995).
Assume that a home and foreign rm export to a third market. Only the home government is policy-
active.21 The third marketassumption implies that the interests of consumers do not enter the home
countrys welfare function and this allows us to focus on the strategic interaction between the rms in
its purest form. The home and foreign rms play a Nash game in actions A and B respectively. These
actions may be either outputs or prices. The advantage of setting up the model in this more general way
is that we do not need to specify whether rms compete on quantities or prices. Firmsprots depend
19Fung (1991) also examines cartel stability under collusive trade. However, he does not discuss the role of trade
liberalisation.
20Throughout this section, our discussion of Cournot competition holds whether products are homogeneous or di¤er-
entiated. By contrast, in the Bertrand case, we need to assume that products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated such that an
interior equilibrium exists.
21Multilateral subsidy games will be discussed later.
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on their own and their rivals actions and on the home governments export subsidy. Thus the home
rms prot function is:
(A;B; s) = (A;B) + sx(A;B); (25)
where  represents operating prots (sales revenue net of production costs) and sx is subsidy income.
The foreign rm is not subsidized and its prots are given by
(A;B): (26)
The home government and the two rms play a two-stage game. In the rst stage the government sets
the per unit subsidy s (which could be negative). In the second stage the rms simultaneously choose
their market actions. Solving for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium we begin by looking at stage 2.
Taking the per unit subsidy as given, the rst-order conditions for the rmsmarket actions are:
A(A;B; s) = A(A;B) + sxA(A;B) = 0; (27)
and
B(A;B) = 0; (28)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The partial derivative xA of home output x with respect to
the home action A is positive and equal to unity if the market action is output, while it is negative and
equal to the slope of the home rms demand curve xp if the action is price. Equation (28) implicitly
denes the foreign rms reaction function, giving B as a function of A. This function will play an
important role below.
We now consider the rst stage in which the home government sets the subsidy anticipating how this
will a¤ect second-stage actions. We will assume that the subsidies are nanced by non-distortionary
lump-sum taxes. Since all output is exported, home welfare is just the home rms prots net of subsidy
payments:
W (A;B) = (A;B; s)  sx(A;B) = (A;B): (29)
Totally di¤erentiate this and make use of the home rms rst-order condition to get:
dW =  sxAdA+ BdB: (30)
The optimal subsidy is then:
so = (xA)
 1B
dB
dA
; (31)
where dB=dA is the slope of the foreign rms reaction function. The sign of the optimal subsidy depends
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on the signs of B , xA and dB=dA. The term B is the cross-e¤ect of the foreign rms market action
on the home rms prots, and we follow Brander in saying that the actions are friendlyif this term is
positive. When actions are unfriendly the foreign action reduces home prots. Outputs under Cournot
competition are unfriendly (B < 0) while prices under Bertrand competition are friendly (B > 0).
However, the derivative xA is negative when prices are the strategic variable while it is positive (equal to
unity) when rms are choosing quantities. Hence regardless of whether rms play Cournot or Bertrand
the combined term (xA) 1B is negative. Thus the sign of the optimal subsidy turns on the slope
of the foreign reaction function dB=dA. Outputs are typically strategic substitutes under Cournot
competition, giving rise to an incentive to subsidize. However, prices are typically strategic complements
under Bertrand competition, giving rise to an incentive to tax exports.
Clearly the Cournot and Bertrand cases di¤er in detail. In Cournot (assuming outputs are strategic
substitutes), the optimal policy is a subsidy, which shifts prots from the foreign to the home rm,
and lowers price so consumers in the third country gain. By contrast, in Bertrand (assuming prices are
strategic complements), the optimal policy is a tax, which shifts prots from the home to the foreign
rm, and raises prices of both goods so consumers in the third country lose. Nevertheless, there is an
important sense in which the two cases are formally identical. In both, the home government uses its
superior commitment power to bring about an equilibrium which the home rm cannot attain on its
own. That equilibrium is identical to the Stackelberg equilibrium which would prevail if the home rm
were (arbitrarily) assumed to be able to choose its action before the foreign rm. It is as if the home
government transfers its rst-mover advantage to the home rm.
3.2 The Robustness of Export Subsidies
While, as we have seen, the optimal policy towards an exporting rm is sensitive to the nature of
competition, it can also be a¤ected by other factors. For instance, even under Cournot competition with
strategic substitutes, the presence of more home rms can change the optimal policy from a subsidy
to a tax.22 This is because the presence of more home rms introduces a terms-of-trade argument for
intervention that must be balanced against the strategic trade motive. Another issue is the social cost of
raising government revenue. The argument for a subsidy is weakened when we allow for the possibility
that the cost of raising the necessary revenue to nance the subsidy is increased by the distortionary
e¤ects of taxation. (See for instance Neary (1994) and Neary and Leahy (2004).) A nal qualication
to the case for export subsidies is that an expansion of one home rm may draw resources away from
oligopolistic rms in other sectors. As Dixit and Grossman (1986) show, the case for subsidisation must
then be qualied to rest on the desirability of subsidising one sector relative to all others. In an extreme
case, if a symmetric group of oligopolistic sectors draw on a common xed factor, say skilled labour,
22This was rst pointed out by Dixit (1984).
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then subsidy rents would be fully captured by that factor, and laissez-faire is the optimal policy. For
all these reasons, the fact that the policy recommendations are so sensitive to the assumptions implies
that governments need to know quite a lot about a particular industry in order to design the optimal
intervention.
So far we have assumed that only the home government intervenes. An obvious extension is to allow
for both governments to be policy active. The most natural way to model this is to assume that the
home and the foreign governments choose their subsidies simultaneously in the rst stage and then the
rms choose their market actions A and B in the second stage. What di¤erence does this make? In
one important sense multilateral intervention makes no di¤erence. If the rmsreaction functions are
negatively sloped then each country still has a unilateral incentive to subsidize and if they are positively
sloped then each has an incentive to tax. However, a unilateral incentive to subsidize runs counter to the
collective interest of countries to reduce exports and thus improve the terms of trade: as Brander and
Spencer (1985) showed, the game between countries is a prisoners dilemma, at least when the countries
are symmetric, in that intervention by both countries lowers their welfare. By contrast, if the rms
reaction functions are upward-sloping, the policy game with symmetric countries yields an outcome
closer to the joint optimum.23
3.3 The Robustness of Investment Subsidies
While the strategic trade argument for an export subsidy is highly sensitive to whether rms engage
in quantity or price competition, the strategic investment policy argument for a subsidy is much more
robust. We will now demonstrate that, although ambiguous in principle, the case for strategic investment
subsidies is reasonably robust in practice.24
Consider a setup like that in Section 3.1 above in which a home and a foreign rm export to a third
market. As before the rms choose actions A and B. However, now assume the home and foreign rms
also choose investment levels k and k respectively before the market actions are set. We do not need
to be very specic regarding the form of the investment carried out by the rms. The investment could
be in capital or in process R&D, in which case it leads to a reduction in the rms production costs. It
could also be in marketing or product quality, which shifts the demand function it faces. In addition the
investment spending of each rm may a¤ect the prots of its rival because of R&D or other spillovers.
The government of the home country is policy active and sets an investment subsidy  (but no export
23See Helpman and Krugman (1989), p. 111. Further applications of such policy games under both Cournot and Bertrand
competition are considered by Collie (2000, 2002).
24Our presentation here follows Leahy and Neary (2001). Spencer and Brander (1983), Bagwell and Staiger (1994),
Maggi (1996) and Neary and Leahy (2000) among others have also shown in di¤erent contexts that an investment subsidy
is typically optimal when a domestic oligopolist faces foreign rivals and an export subsidy is unavailable.
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subsidy) before the rms decide on their investment levels. The prots of the home rm are:
(k; k; A;B; ) = (k; k; A;B)  k; (32)
where k represents the rms subsidy income. The foreign rm does not receive a subsidy and its prot
function is represented by:
(k; k; A;B): (33)
In the nal stage of the game the rms choose their market actions taking the investments and the
subsidies as given. The resulting rst-order conditions do not depend directly on the investment subsidy:
A(k; k
; A;B) = 0 and B(k; k
; A;B) = 0: (34)
From these we can obtain the Nash equilibrium in actions A(k; k) and B(k; k) which depend on the
levels of investment. We can use the equilibrium level of the actions to eliminate A and B in the prot
functions. The resulting reduced-formoperating prot functions are distinguished by hats:
b(k; k) = [k; k; A(k; k); B(k; k)] and b(k; k) = [k; k; A(k; k); B(k; k)]; (35)
for the home and foreign rms respectively.
We turn now to the second stage of the game in which the rms simultaneously choose their investment
levels given the subsidy and anticipating how the investments will a¤ect the subsequent equilibrium in
actions. The home rm maximizes the following reduced-form total prot function, equal to operating
prot plus subsidy revenue: b(k; k; ) = b(k; k) + k: (36)
As for the government in the home country, it wishes to maximise:
cW (k; k) = b(k; k; )  k = b(k; k): (37)
It is clear by inspection that the reduced-form prot and welfare functions in (36) and (37) have the same
form as the corresponding functions (25) and (29) in Section 3.1. Hence we can immediately determine
the optimal subsidy:
o = bk dk
dk
: (38)
As before, the sign of the optimal subsidy depends on the signs of the friendliness term bk and on the
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slope of the foreign reaction function dk=dk. The slope of the reaction function can be written as:
dk
dk
=   bkkbkk : (39)
The denominator is negative from the foreign rms second-order condition for prot maximisation.
Therefore the slope of the reaction function depends on the sign of bkk, which indicates whether foreign
investment is a strategic substitute (bkk < 0) or strategic complement (bkk > 0) for home investment.
Hence, we can say that the optimal strategic industrial policy is an investment subsidy if and only if
an increase in investment by one rm has the same qualitative e¤ect on its rivals prots in total and
at the margin: i.e., if and only if bk and bkk have the same sign. With simple functional forms these
two concepts tend to have the same sign. As we show in Leahy and Neary (2001), we can expect that
the optimal policy will be a subsidy because there is a presumption that unfriendliness (bk < 0) and
strategic substitutability (bkk < 0) will be found together as will friendliness (bk > 0) and strategic
complementarity (bkk > 0). So, although the general expression for the subsidy in (38) seems to indicate
that not much can be said about the likelihood that subsidization will be the optimal policy, this turns
out to be the case for most functional forms.
3.4 Multilateral Investment Subsidy Games
As we have just seen, governments have a unilateral incentive to use rent-shifting investment subsidies.
This remains the case when we extend the model to allow for the governments of an arbitrary number
of countries to choose their investment subsidies simultaneously. However, such subsidy wars among
exporters can give rise to a prisoners dilemma. In that case, all the exporting countries would be better
o¤ if they agreed to ban investment subsidies altogether. However, if investment is in R&D and this
generates international spillovers then investment subsidies may be friendly to other countries. We will
compare welfare when governments choose investment subsidies with welfare in the non-intervention
regime.
We extend the model of the previous subsection to a symmetric oligopolistic industry with n identical
rms, each of which is located in one of n countries, and sells on a single outside market with no tari¤s or
transport costs. Once again, the game consists of three stages. In the rst stage, subsidies are set either
by national governments or by a supra-national authority. Then, as in earlier sub-sections, the rms
choose in turn their investments and market actions. The model used is a version of the multi-country
multi-rm model in Leahy and Neary (2009). Collie (2005) and Haaland and Kind (2006, 2008) consider
similar issues in the context of R&D subsidies, though in relatively special models.25
Modify equation (36) slightly to extend the notation to cover many rms. A typical rm maximizes
25Besley and Seabright (1999) present a related but di¤erent approach to international competition which takes the form
of state aids to industry.
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the following reduced-form total prot function:
bi(ki;k i; i) = bi(ki;k i) + iki: (40)
where variables in bold denote vectors, so k i is the vector of investments by rms other than rm i.
We continue to assume that the rms export to a third country so that consumer surplus does not enter
the welfare function. (The consequences of relaxing this assumption are discussed in detail in Leahy and
Neary (2009).) The government in country i wishes to maximise:
cW i(ki;k i) = bi(ki;k i; i)  iki = bi(ki;k i) (41)
Aggregate welfare of the n countries is:
cW (k) =Pbi(ki;k i) (42)
We consider three di¤erent regimes which we will refer to as laissez-faire (L), non-cooperative intervention
(N) and cooperative intervention (C) respectively. The laissez-faire equilibrium arises when all subsidies
i are zero, and can be thought of as arising from a commitment to non-intervention on the part of
the n countriesgovernments. In the non-cooperative intervention case, countries play a Nash game in
subsidies, each seeking to maximise national welfare. Finally, the cooperative equilibrium occurs when a
supra-national authority chooses a uniform subsidy to maximise the countriesaggregate welfare, which
is simply the sum of their individual welfare levels. This regime yields the highest level of welfare and
we use it as a benchmark with which to compare the other two regimes.
In the laissez-faire regime the typical rm maximises (40) with i set at zero. The rst-order condition
is bii = 0. It proves useful to introduce a function mL() which is the marginal return to investment net
of marginal investment costs under laissez-faire evaluated at a symmetric level of investment, . Thus
the rst-order condition under laissez-faire can be rewritten as mL(L) = bii = 0:
In the Non-Cooperative regime the typical government chooses its subsidy to maximise national
welfare (41). The typical government has one instrument (its investment subsidy) with which it can
target the investment level of its rm. It is very convenient to see the government as using its subsidy to
control its own rms investment with the other rmsinvestments adjusting according to their reaction
functions. This yields the rst-order condition:
mN (N ) = bii + (n  1)bij dkjdki = 0 (43)
where mN is the net marginal return to investment in the non-cooperative case. Likewise, in the cooper-
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ative regime the supra-national authority can be seen as choosing all the investment levels to maximise
aggregate welfare (42). The rst-order condition is:
mC(C) = bii + (n  1)bji = 0 (44)
where mC is the net marginal return to investment in the cooperative case
We now wish to compare the levels of investment in the di¤erent regimes. To do this we must compare
the net marginal returns to investment in the di¤erent regimes. Naturally we need to be cautious as
mL(L); mN (N ) and mC(C) are evaluated at di¤erent symmetric investment levels. However, we
can compare the di¤erent net marginal returns to investment at any common point. We show in Leahy
and Neary (2009) that provided the rankings of marginal returns to investment are the same in all
three regimes and some other stability assumptions are made then the ranking of symmetric equilibrium
investment levels () across the three regimes is the same as the ranking of the marginal returns to
investment. A comparison of mL and mN at any common point yields:
mN () mL() = (n  1)bij dkjdki (45)
This is a generalization of the two-rm case considered in the earlier section. It shows that the investment
levels will be higher when governments intervene than when they do not provided that bij (the friendliness
term) and dk
j
dki (which is positive if and only if investments are strategic complements) have the same sign.
This is also the same condition as the one that determines the sign of the non-cooperative investment
subsidy. So, as explained earlier, there is a presumption that mN   mL is positive and thus that the
governments will give positive subsidies and that N > L.
Is it in the countries collective interest to subsidize investment? To answer this question we must
compare mC and mL.This yields:
mC() mL() = (n  1)bji (46)
which is positive if and only if investments are friendly. If there are no positive spillovers then this
is negative and so it is in the interests of the group of countries to use a tax to reduce the level of
investment. However if there are su¢ ciently strong spillovers that investments raise rivalsprots then
the cooperative subsidy is positive and C is bigger than L. The sign of the friendliness term also
determines whether or not the non-cooperative investment level is too high from the point of view of the
collective:
mC() mN () = (n  1)bij 1  dkjdki

(47)
The right-hand side depends only on the sign of bij as 1  dkjdki is always positive due to stability consid-
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erations as we show in Leahy and Neary (2009).
bji
  Unfriendly + Friendly
biij   Strategic substitutes N > L > C C > L > N
+ Strategic complements L > N > C C > N > L
Table 1: Rankings of Investment Levels in Di¤erent Equilibria
The investment rankings in the di¤erent equilibria are reported in Table 1. As noted in Section
3.3, there is a presumption that unfriendliness and strategic substitutability are found together, as are
friendliness and strategic complementarity. Hence we can focus on the diagonal entries in the table. In the
top left-hand entry, where investments are unfriendly and strategic substitutes, the level of investment
is highest under non-cooperation and lowest under cooperation. The cooperative investment level is
always the one that maximises the welfare of the group of countries. If we assume that welfare is
concave in  then, since L is closer to C than is N , governments acting alone over-subsidise: welfare is
higher under laissez-faire than under non-cooperative subsidy setting. This case is more likely to prevail
if positive spillovers are low and the rms compete very intensely (goods are close substitutes). By
contrast, in the bottom right-hand entry, where investments are friendly and strategic complements, the
level of investment is highest under cooperation and lowest under laissez-faire. In this case the individual
governments do not subsidise enough from the perspective of the collective. This case is more likely to
hold if benecial spillovers are high and/or rms do not compete too intensely.
3.5 Trade and Industrial Policy Towards Dynamic Oligopoly
In this subsection we consider an extension of the strategic trade and investment model to an indenite
(though nite) number T of time periods. However, we return to the setup with one home and one
foreign rm and one policy-active government. In each period t, each rm takes an action, choosing the
value of some variable, At for the home rm and Bt for the foreign rm. This specication encompasses
all those cases considered so far: in each period the decision variables might be output, price, R&D
or marketing. In a further departure from previous sub-sections, we allow for the possibility that the
policy-active government can set subsidies in more than one time period.
The rmsprots depend on a vector of their own actions and a vector of their rivals actions and on
all the home governments subsidies. The home rms prot function is:
(A;B; s) = (A;B) + S(A;B; s); (48)
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where A and B are the vectors of the home and foreign rms actions respectively and s is the vector
of subsidies. As before, the rms gross prots  are made up of prots net of subsidy income  and
its subsidy income S. In many applications, the subsidy income is linear in the rms decision variables,
so that St = stat where St is subsidy income in period t. Examples of this include an R&D subsidy or
an output subsidy under Cournot competition. By contrast, as we have seen in Subsection 3.1, subsidy
income depends in a more complicated way on the subsidy rate in the case of an output subsidy under
Bertrand competition. It is clear that equation (48) is a T -period generalisation of equation (25). The
foreign rms prots are now given by
(A;B): (49)
which is similarly a T -period generalisation of equation (26).
Each rm now has T rst-order conditions, one for each period. These can be written in vector
notation as: 
d
dA
0
= 0A +
0
B
dB
dA
+0s
ds
dA
= 0; (50)
and

d
dB
0
= 0B + 
0
A
dA
dB
= 0; (51)
where a prime denotes the transpose of a vector. It is instructive to compare these with the corresponding
rst-order conditions when the rms choose an action in one period only. (See Subsection 3.1 above.)
Apart from the obvious di¤erence that these are now vectors rather than scalars the key di¤erence is
the presence of strategic terms. An action chosen by a rm before the other rm or the government
chooses its action may a¤ect the value of that action. (These e¤ects are captured by the matrices dB=dA,
ds=dA and dA=dB.) This in turn a¤ects the prots of the rm in a manner that depends on whether
the a¤ected action is friendly or unfriendly.
The home welfare function:
W (A;B) = (A;B; s)  S(A;B; s) = (A;B): (52)
is a T -period generalisation of (29). When does the government set its subsidies in this T -period game?
One possibility is that all the subsidies are set at the very start of the game before any of the actions of the
rms are chosen. In that case we can say that the government has superior intertemporal commitment
power to the home rm. (Note then that a subsidy labelled st is chosen in period 1 but the subsidized
action At occurs in period t.) Another possibility is that the subsidies are actually set in the period in
which they become e¤ective. Our setup allows for both possibilities and for any of the cases in between.
However, we do impose the following minimum structure on the T -period game. We assume that within
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time periods the rms play a Nash game, setting At and Bt simultaneously, but that if the government
subsidizes the period t activities of its rm then the corresponding subsidy st is always chosen before At
and Bt. (However, it is not necessarily chosen before every action by the rms.) Thus we say that the
government always has superior intratemporal commitment power to the home rm.
To obtain the optimal subsidies, totally di¤erentiate (52) to get a necessary condition for welfare
maximisation:
dW = 0AdA+ 
0
BdB = 0: (53)
As we show in Neary and Leahy (2000) it is possible to solve the foreign rst-order condition equations
for generalised reaction functions, which express the foreign rms actions as functions of all of the home
rms: B = eB(A). In di¤erential form this is dB =eBAdA. Use this to eliminate dB in (53). We can
also use the home rms rst-order conditions and the fact that A = A + SA to eliminate A in (53).
This yields the following expression for the optimal subsidies:
S0A = 
0
B
eBA  0B dBdA  0s dsdA : (54)
When we compare this expression to (31), which gives the optimal subsidy in the one-period strategic
trade model, we see that the rst term is simply a dynamic generalisation of the rent-shifting e¤ect in the
static strategic trade model. Algebraically this term is obtained by multiplying the friendliness term B
by the slope of the foreign reaction function eBA. The remaining terms on the right-hand side are new
in a dynamic setting and reect the fact that the government must correct for the home rms strategic
behaviour.26
To obtain more concrete results consider a two-period example in which the government cannot
commit to its subsidies in advance of the time period in which they become e¤ective. Thus st is chosen
in period t before At and Bt, and the game now consists of four stages. From equation (54) the optimal
rst-period subsidy in this case is:
S1A1 + S
2
A1 = (
1
B1 + 
2
B1)
eB11 + 2B2 eB21   B2 dB2dA1 +s2 ds2dA1

; (55)
where t refers to period t operating prot,  denotes the discount factor, and the rent-shifting and
strategic correction terms are written in full. In period 2 the governments problem is now particularly
26The rst two terms on the right-hand side of (54) may appear to be very similar except in sign. Both consist of
a friendliness term multiplied by the slope of a foreign reaction function. Moreover, B   B = SB = 0 in the many
applications in which the subsidy income is linear in the rms decision variables. However, the matrices eBA and dB=dA
di¤er in an important respect which reects the governments superior commitment power. The matrix eBA gives the
derivatives of foreign actions with respect to home actions from the perspective of the home government. This di¤ers in
general from the matrix dB=dA in which the derivatives are from the perspective of the home rm. The di¤erence between
the two reects the fact that within any time period the home and foreign rm choose their actions simultaneously, so all
elements on and above the principal diagonal of the matrix dB=dA are zero; whereas the home government always has
superior commitment power (at least intratemporally), so some or all of the corresponding elements in the matrix eBA are
non-zero.
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simple. With A1 and B1 already determined, it faces a standard static problem and the optimal subsidy
is given by the static rent-shifting formula S2A2 = 
2
B2
eB22 which can be rewritten as (31) above. Note that
neither rm can play strategically against its rival in the nal stage of the game and so the government
only needs to correct rm strategic behaviour in period 1 with adjustments to the rst-period subsidy.
To take a specic example, suppose that the rms play Cournot for two periods and that a rms
marginal cost in period 2 is a decreasing function of period-1 output due to learning by doing. (See
Leahy and Neary (1999).) Then the term B2
dB2
dA1
will be positive as rm 1 strategically overproduces
in period 1 to reduce its rivals output in period 2. As seen in (55) this will require the government to
reduce the rst-period subsidy to correct for this. Furthermore if the period-2 subsidy s2 is chosen after
the period-1 action A1, then the rm will overproduce to gain a higher period-two subsidy. (The term
s2
ds2
dA1
will be positive.) Anticipating this, the government will further reduce the rst-period subsidy.
In this example, the home rms overproduction in period 1 illustrates what Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984) call Top Dogbehaviour: because a higher action by the home rm in period 1 reduces the rival
rms period-2 prots, and period-2 actions are strategic substitutes, the home rm has an incentive
to behave more aggressively in period 1. Fudenberg and Tirole extend this insight to present a full
animal spiritstaxonomy of behaviour in games of this kind. Such behaviour in turn justies a policy
intervention, since the home rms aggressive action consumes real resources. In this example, a lower
subsidy is warranted to deter the overproduction. In the terminology of Neary and Leahy (2000), the
government should intervene to restrain the Top Dog. The same paper extends this idea to show
that Fudenberg and Tiroles animal spirits taxonomy of strategies by rms implies a corresponding
animal trainingtaxonomy of optimal policy responses by governments.
4 Trade in General Oligopolistic Equilibrium
4.1 From Partial to General Equilibrium27
So far, all the models considered have focused on a single industry only. They can be given a general-
equilibrium foundation, though only under special assumptions. It is instructive to begin by spelling
these out, and then considering how they may be relaxed.
As already noted in Section 2.1, utility functions such as (1) dened over consumption levels of a
single industry can be rationalised if the upper-tier utility function is quasi-linear:
U = x0 + u (x) (56)
Here x0 is the consumption of the outside good, which is really a composite commodity dened over all
27This sub-section draws on Neary (2003a).
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the other goods in the economy, which are assumed to be produced under perfect competition. As before,
x is the consumption of the output of the oligopolistic sector. (For simplicity we assume in this section
that goods within each sector are homogeneous.) Maximising (56) subject to a budget constraint, it can
be seen that the marginal propensity to consume x is zero: all income e¤ects fall on the outside good, so
the demand function for x can be considered independently of the level of income. In practice the price
of the outside good is often normalised to equal one, and it is then called the numéraire good, though
this is just a convenient choice of measuring rod rather than a primitive property.
To move from the quasi-linear utility function (56) to the partial-equilibrium welfare function (11),
we rst make use of the identity between national expenditure and national income:
x0 + px = wl0 + (wl +) (57)
Here l0 and l denote employment levels in the two sectors. (This is fully consistent with any number
of factors of production, provided their relative prices are given.) Assuming that the same wages are
paid in all sectors, we can invoke the full-employment condition l0 + l = L to rewrite (57) as an equality
between national expenditure and national product at factor cost wL plus prots :
x0 + px = wL+ (58)
Finally, use this to eliminate consumption of the numéraire good x0 from (56):
U = wL+ + where:   u (x)  px (59)
Equation (59) shows that the quasi-linear utility function (56) can be reexpressed as the sum of three
components: wL is national product valued at factor cost;   u (x)   px is consumer surplus in the
non-numéraire sector; and  is prots in that sector. Hence, provided w can be taken as given (i.e.,
provided the non-numéraire sector is small in factor markets relative to the numéraire one), utility and
welfare equal simply the sum of consumer surplus and prots, just as in (11).
A similar derivation was used by Brander and Spencer (1984, pp. 198-9) to justify their claim that
models of strategic trade policy have valid general-equilibrium underpinnings.28 Their conclusion is
worth quoting in full: The essential question is not whether a model is partial or general equilibrium
but whether the industry in question is large enough to give rise to income e¤ects, cross-substitution
e¤ects in demand and factor price e¤ects.While we fully agree on the substance, we also believe that
it is convenient to have a single shorthand term to refer to the very special case of general equilibrium
28As Feenstra and Rose (2000, p. 11) point out: Brander and Spencer (1985) ... arose out of an attempt to convince Ron
Jones that their earlier paper on international R&D rivalry [Spencer and Brander (1983)] worked in a general equilibrium
setting.
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where we can ignore income e¤ects and inter-sectoral substitution e¤ects on the demand side, and cost
changes on the factor-market side. Rather than inventing a new term, it seems natural to use the label
partial equilibriumfor the case where the industry is not large enough to give rise to the latter e¤ects.
The substantive question remains: is it justiable to make these partial equilibriumassumptions?
There are clearly many contexts where it is. In industrial organisation, for example, it is natural to have
a partial-equilibrium focus: to understand the workings of a single market, it makes sense to ignore the
wider context. And as previous sections have shown, there are a great many issues in international trade
which can be illuminated by partial-equilibrium models. Nevertheless, many of the central questions in
international trade involve comparisons between sectors, and links between goods and factor markets.
This is true, for example, of the determinants of trade patterns, the economy-wide gains from trade, and
the e¤ects of trade on income distribution. A full understanding of such questions requires a framework
which allows for multiple sectors and which explicitly models the links between goods and factor markets,
in other words, a general-equilibrium framework which does not rely on the special assumptions listed
above.
However, embedding oligopoly models in general equilibrium has generally been viewed as posing
severe technical problems. This arises from the perception that a general-equilibrium model of oligopoly
should require rms to solve general-equilibrium problems while still playing strategically against each
other, a combination which implies extremely complex modelling. For example, Roberts and Sonnen-
schein (1977) showed that if oligopolists rationally anticipate the e¤ects of their choices on national
income, the resulting reaction functions are extremely badly behaved, and even in simple models an
equilibrium may not exist. A di¤erent problem, highlighted by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), is that if
oligopolists anticipate their impact on the aggregate price level, then the consequences of their actions are
sensitive to the deator used to evaluate the real value of prots.29 It is true that considerable progress
can be made by ignoring these problems (examples include Markusen (1984) and Ru¢ n (2003)), but this
has not met with universal approval.
A consistent approach to modelling oligopoly in general equilibrium requires that rms are large in
the small but small in the large: playing strategically against a small number of competitors in their
own sectors, just like the rms in earlier sections; while at the same time too small in the economy as a
whole to inuence aggregate variables such as national income or the price level. A natural framework
in which to formalise this idea is the continuum-of-sectors model of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson
(1977). Originally presented in a competitive framework, with a continuum of rms in each sector, this
model can be modied to allow for only a small number of rms producing a homogeneous good in each
sector, so allowing for a consistent model of oligopoly in general equilibrium.
A key step in operationalising the large in the small but small in the largeapproach is to specify
29Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) call this outcome a sensitivity to the choice of numéraire.
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a tractable specication of preferences. From this perspective, a very desirable feature of preferences is
that they are additively separable. This implies that the inverse demand for each good depends only on
its own consumption q (z) and on the marginal utility of income in the economy, : p (z) = f [q (z) ; ].
(Here z 2 [0; 1] denotes sectors.) Hence  is a su¢ cient statistic for all the determinants of demand
coming from outside the sector. Rationally, rms take  as given when competing strategically against
their rivals in sector z, whereas it is endogenous in the economy as a whole. The distinction between the
demand function with  parametric and with  endogenously determined parallels the distinction between
perceived and actual demand functions in the literature on monopolistic competition. Finally, to
get closed-form solutions, it is convenient to focus on the special case of additive preferences where the
demand function is linear in prices, so it takes the form: p (z) = a0  b0q (z), with a0  a= and b0  b=.
In the remainder of this section we sketch this approach, following Neary (2002b, 2003a), and discuss
some applications and extensions.
4.2 Specialisation Patterns in International Oligopoly
To understand the model it is useful to begin by taking a rms-eye view, focusing on equilibrium in
individual sectors with wages and the marginal utility of income taken as parametric. We assume that
rms engage in Cournot competition on an integrated world market. Following Neary (2003a), we assume
that rms di¤er between countries but not within. So in the home country there are n rms, each with
unit cost c, producing a level of output x. Similarly in the foreign country, there are n rms, each with
unit cost c, producing a level of output y. (For convenience, we suppress the sector index z in this
sub-section.) The possible equilibrium patterns of international specialisation are then as illustrated in
Figure 2, in the space of home and foreign costs.30 First, if all rms have costs above the maximum price
that consumers are willing to pay, a0, then the good will not be produced in either country, as illustrated
by region O. Next, we can ask what is the equilibrium output of a home rm. Standard calculations
show that this equals:
x =
a0   (n + 1) c+ nc
b (n+ n + 1)
(60)
Hence, ignoring xed costs for simplicity, home rms will produce positive output (x > 0) if and only if
their costs are su¢ ciently low, such that c < a
0+nc
n+1 . The threshold value of c denes the locus which
separates the F and HF regions in Figure 2, where F has active foreign rms only, while HF has active
rms in both countries. A corresponding argument denes the locus which represents zero output by
foreign rms (y = 0), separating the HF and H regions.
The most interesting of these regions is HF . We can call it a cone of diversication, and it is
special to oligopoly. Under perfectly competitive assumptions, the model would be identical to that of
Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977), complete specialisation would take place, and so the HF
30For an independent development of this gure, see Collie (1991).
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region would collapse to the 45 line. By contrast, in oligopoly, high- and low-cost rms coexist in the
HF region. For example, at any point above the 45 line in this cone, home rms have higher costs than
foreign rms and therefore (in a free-trade equilibrium) they have lower output.31 However, they are
not driven out of business, because of the barriers to entry which underpin the oligopoly equilibrium.
Foreign rms with lower costs are making greater prots, and if entry were free, the number of foreign
rms would grow until all home rms had been driven out of business. Thus, entry barriers in the low-cost
country serve to cushion high-cost rms from foreign competition under free trade, just as tari¤ barriers
in a perfectly competitive model allow for the coexistence of high and low-cost rms. (See Dornbusch,
Fischer and Samuelson (1977), Section III.C).
So far, Figure 2 illustrates all the possible equilibria conditional on production costs and the marginal
utility of income  taken as given. To embed this in general equilibrium, we rst invoke the standard
Ricardian assumptions about technology and labour markets, relating unit costs in all sectors to local
wages and technology. Assume therefore that labour is the only factor of production and that the unit
labour requirements for home and foreign rms are xed, denoted by  (z) and  (z) respectively. We
assume in addition that labour is perfectly mobile within countries, but immobile internationally, and
that labour markets are perfectly competitive. Hence the production cost in each sector equals the
product of its exogenously-determined unit labour requirement and the national wage rate:
c (z) = w (z) and c (z) = w (z) (61)
in the home and foreign countries respectively. Next we need to assume that the sectors can be ranked
such that home and foreign costs can be directly compared. A su¢ cient condition for this is that home
labour requirements are increasing in z and foreign labour requirements are decreasing in z: 0 (z) > 0
and 0 (z) < 0.32 For given wages in both countries, we can then express the cost of production in each
sector at home as a decreasing function of the corresponding cost abroad.33 This is illustrated by the
downward-sloping locus in Figure 2. In the case shown, this implies that there are three kinds of sectors,
with the boundaries between them denoted ~z and ~z. In all sectors for which z is less than ~z, only
home rms make non-negative prots; while in all sectors for which z is greater than ~z, only foreign rms
make non-negative prots. The third kind of sectors are those in the cone of diversication, with values
of z lying between ~z and ~z, in which both home and foreign rms are active. These threshold sectors,
~z and ~z, which are endogenously determined in general equilibrium, demarcate the extensive margins
of production in the home and foreign countries respectively. Note that the conguration illustrated in
Figure 2 is only one possible outcome. For example, the equilibrium value of ~z could equal one, in which
31Note that, even with di¤erent numbers of rms at home and abroad, the locus along which outputs are the same is the
45 line. To see this, equate equation (60) to the corresponding equation for the foreign rm.
32This condition is much stronger than necessary, but very convenient. For further discussion, see Neary (2002b).
33Formally, this involves combining the two equations in (61) to eliminate z: c = w
h
 1

c
w
i
.
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case home rms would be active in all sectors; similarly, the equilibrium value of ~z could equal zero, in
which case foreign rms would be active in all sectors.
So far the wage rates have been taken as exogenous. Their equilibrium values are implied by assump-
tions already made, with the additional assumption (natural in a trade model) that total labour supplies
are xed in each country. Thus, in the home country, the equilibrium wage rate adjusts to equate supply
of and demand for labour:
L =
Z ~z
0
n (z)x (z) dz where: x (z) =
8><>:
a0 c
b(n+1) for z 2 [0; ~z]
a0 (n+1)c+nc
b(n+n+1) for z 2 [~z; ~z]
(62)
The aggregate demand for labour is simply the integral of the demands from all sectors with active home
rms: in other words, rm output x (z) times its unit labour requirement  (z) times the number of rms
n. The only complication is that the expression for rm output di¤ers between sectors. In sectors with
z 2 [0; ~z] ; foreign rms cannot compete, so home rms face only domestic competition; while sectors
with z 2 [~z; ~z] lie in the cone of diversication, so both home and foreign rms are active and the output
of a typical home rm is given by (60). An exactly analogous equation equates demand and supply of
labour in the foreign country. Hence we have four equations in total, two labour-market equilibrium
equations plus two equations specifying zero output for each of the threshold sectors, which combine to
determine simultaneously the four endogenous variables: the home and foreign wage rates and the values
of the threshold sectors.
4.3 Autarky versus Free Trade: Welfare, Income Distribution and Trade
Patterns
A natural question which arises in this model is the comparison between autarky and free trade. To
facilitate this, it is convenient to assume that countries are symmetric and always produce all goods (so
the fc; cg locus lies strictly inside the HF region).34 The assumption of full diversication precludes the
complete specialisation in production which drives the gains from trade in a competitive model. However,
there are other sources of gain from trade in oligopoly. First, domestic rms face more competition in free
trade than in autarky, which reduces their mark-ups, lowering prices to consumers in all sectors. Second,
comparative advantage still operates, even though complete specialisation does not occur. In sectors
where home rms are more e¢ cient, they expand their scale of operations, while foreign rms contract;
and conversely in sectors where foreign rms are more e¢ cient. As a result, labour is reallocated from
low- to high-productivity sectors, generating a further gain from trade.
Thus, comparative advantage and pro-competitive e¤ects combine to raise welfare. However, where
34The fact that countries are symmetric does not mean that they are identical. In particular, while the average labour
productivity over all sectors is the same in both countries, there is scope for comparative advantage di¤erences:  (z) =
 (1  z) and R 10  (z) dz = R 10  (z) dz, but in general  (z) 6=  (z).
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income distribution is concerned, they work in opposite directions. Note that, although there is only
one primary factor of production in this Ricardian model, the persistence of pure prots allows the
consideration of income distribution. Moving from autarky to free trade, the competition e¤ect tends
to squeeze prots, as increased demand for labour bids up wages. By contrast, specialisation according
to comparative advantage implies that resources are reallocated towards the more productive sectors.
With a xed number of rms, this process tends to benet prot recipients, as workers are laid o¤ more
in less productive sectors than they are absorbed in more productive ones. As a result, the gains from
comparative advantage accrue to prot recipients, and it is even possible that they can outweigh the
positive e¤ects of greater competition, leading to a fall in the share of wages in free trade relative to
autarky.
Of course, because of oligopoly, there are missing gains from trade: if barriers to entry were
removed, the two countries would specialise completely and welfare would be higher. In the same way,
oligopoly provides a potential explanation for missing trade.35 The volume of trade is reduced relative
to a perfectly competitive trading equilibrium on both the supply and demand sides. Because welfare is
lower, the demand for all goods including imports is reduced. And because of oligopolistic barriers to
entry, output of each sector is also lower than it would be in the competitive case. It follows that trade
volumes are less than they would be if the barriers to entry were removed.
4.4 Extensions and Applications
Models of oligopoly in general equilibrium have been applied to a range of issues. Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2010) develop a model similar to that described above, but assuming that rms compete
on price rather than on quantity, which they apply to consider the role of external economies. The
assumption of a continuum of sectors allows for a clean analysis of the properties of the model, without
the discontinuities found in classic treatments of external economies such as Ethier (1982b), where rms
are large in the economy as a whole as well as in their own market. A di¤erent approach to modelling the
mode of competition between rms is adopted by Neary and Tharakan (2006). Building on Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) and Maggi (1996), they assume that rms rst invest in capacity and then compete
on price. If the cost advantage of investing in capacity is su¢ ciently large, then the outcome of this two-
stage game resembles that of a one-stage Cournot game where rms compete only in quantities. Maggi
considered only a single industry in partial equilibrium, where the advantage of investing in capacity
was exogenous and determined by technology alone. By contrast, in the general-equilibrium model of
Neary and Tharakan, sectors di¤er in the cost advantage of investing in capacity, and capacity requires
a di¤erent mix of factors from production. As a result, relative factor prices play a role in determining
35See also Ru¢ n (2003). The mystery of the missing trade, the fact that world trade is less than we would expect
from international di¤erences in factor endowments, was rst highlighted by Treer (1995). Other possible explanations
are explored by Davis and Weinstein (2001).
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the extent of competition in the economy, and factor prices are themselves determined endogenously in
general equilibrium. As a result, the model allows for the endogenous determination of the mix of sectors
between those exhibiting more and less competitive, or Bertrand and Cournot behaviour.
Intersectoral di¤erences in factor mix can also provide insights into the impact of international trade
on relative wages, as shown by Neary (2002a). In both perfectly and monopolistically competitive
models, increased foreign competition impacts on domestic rms only via changes in the prices they
face, but empirical studies have failed to nd a su¢ ciently large e¤ect of import prices. This has led
many researchers to conclude that rises in the skill premium, the higher wage enjoyed by skilled relative
to unskilled workers, are due to skill-biased technological progress rather than increased competition
and trade from low-wage countries. However, models of oligopoly introduce the possibility of non-price
interaction between rms. An extreme example of this in Neary (2002a) is where domestic rms are
induced to engage in what Wood (1994) calls defensive innovation even though no imports actually
occur. The source of this is the threat of trade (as imports become potentially more competitive) which
encourages home rms to engage in strategic investment to deter entry. Provided investment is relatively
skill-intensive, this in turn leads to an increase in the skill premium.
In the same vein, models of oligopoly in general equilibrium have been shown to shed light on
particular issues which cannot be considered in either competitive general-equilibrium or oligopolistic
partial-equilibrium models. Neary (2003b) considers a unilateral increase in the number of rms in each
sector as an improvement in the economys competitive advantage, and shows how this interacts with
comparative advantage: the economy gains as it specialises in those sectors in which it is relatively
more e¢ cient, though the higher wage induced by greater competition between rms causes marginal
sectors to cease production. Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) explore the implications of unionisation in
a subset of sectors, and show that it can reverse the conclusions of partial-equilibrium models. Because
the outside option of unionised workers is endogenous in general equilibrium, they show that union wages
may increase with rm entry and may be higher in free trade than in autarky. Finally, models of oligopoly
make it possible to explore the implications of endogenous changes in market structure. Neary (2007)
shows that trade liberalisation in the model of the last subsection creates incentives for cross-border
mergers. Moreover, the model predicts that such mergers will generate ows of foreign direct investment
that take place in the same direction as trade ows: home rms in sectors which enjoy a comparative
advantage will also have a greater incentive to take over smaller less productive foreign rms. This is
in contrast with standard models of greeneld foreign direct investment which predict counterfactually
that trade and foreign direct investment are always substitutes.
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5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have given a selective survey of the theory of international trade under oligopoly,
concentrating on three topics: oligopoly as an independent determinant of trade, as illustrated by the
reciprocal-markets model of Brander (1981); oligopoly as an independent rationale for government inter-
vention, as illustrated by strategic trade and industrial policy in the third-market model of Spencer and
Brander (1983) and Brander and Spencer (1985); and the challenges and potential of embedding trade
under oligopoly in general equilibrium.
Naturally, space constraints have forced us to omit many important topics which have also been
considered in the literature. For example, our discussion of strategic trade policy concentrated on the
third-market model and ignored policies towards imports, both tari¤s and quantitative restrictions.
These were rst considered by Brander and Spencer (1984) and Krishna (1989) respectively, and the
general issues of strategic trade policy in the reciprocal-markets model are surveyed by Brander (1995).
We have paid no attention to strategic trade policy under uncertainty, which has been addressed by
Cooper and Riezman (1989) and Dewit and Leahy (2004); nor under asymmetric information, which has
been explored by Collie and Hviid (1993) and Brainard and Martimort (1997). We have also ignored the
important topic of competition policy, which arises naturally in an oligopoly context and can be analysed
in the same way as strategic trade policy. The possibility of a¤ecting national welfare by controlling the
number of domestic rms was rst explored by Dixit (1984), and related aspects of competition policy in
open-economy oligopoly models have been considered by Horn and Levinsohn (2001) and Francois and
Horn (2007). In addition, we have ignored foreign direct investment, at least of the greeneld kind, and
given only a brief discussion of one approach to strategic aspects of cross-border mergers in Section 4.
These topics are covered in more detail in Chapter 8 of this volume. Finally, we have not considered the
implications of oligopoly for preferential trade agreements and international trade negotiations, topics
which are attracting increasing attention. (See, for example, Yi (1996) and Mrázová (2010).)
Turning from theory to empirics, oligopoly in trade does not lend itself easily to empirical work, at
least using large rm-level data sets of the kind that have become available in the 1990s and 2000s,
which have made applied trade theory such an exciting eld of research. Most empirical applications of
oligopolistic trade models so far have been in the normative area. See for example the papers in Krugman
and Smith (1994), as wall as Baldwin and Flam (1989), which use calibration methods to quantify the
gains and losses from strategic trade policy.36 The real-world example most often cited in this context
is international competition between Airbus and Boeing in the commercial aircraft industry. (See Dixit
and Kyle (1985).) Irwin (1991) applies the strategic trade policy framework to a much earlier industry.
He uses a duopoly model calibrated with data from the East India spice trade in the early seventeenth
century to illustrate the e¤ects of trade policies and institutional arrangements on the rivalry between
36Norman (1990) and Francois and Roland-Holst (1997) provide overviews of this literature.
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the English and the Dutch East India companies. As for the positive theory of trade under oligopoly,
empirical studies of intra-industry trade patterns arising from oligopolistic competition have been carried
out by Bernhofen (1999) and Friberg and Ganslandt (2006). A related paper by Feenstra, Markusen and
Rose (2001) shows that a wide range of theories are consistent with a gravity-type equation, and nds
empirical results that t the predictions of the reciprocal dumping model with homogeneous goods and
restricted entry.
A frequently heard criticism of oligopolistic trade models is that their predictions are highly sensitive
to the mode of competition. Arguably this perception has been overstated. To a large extent, it arose
from the early demonstration by Eaton and Grossman (1986) that one of the rst and highest-prole
results on strategic trade policy, the Brander-Spencer (1985) nding that export subsidies are optimal,
is reversed when we move from Cournot to Bertrand competition. Nonetheless, the general case for
intervention is the same in both cases: governments can improve national welfare by exercising their
superior commitment power relative to domestic and foreign rms. Moreover, as we have seen, the
argument for activist investment policies is more robust than that for export policies. Similarly, in the
reciprocal markets model, the prediction of cross-hauling of identical goods is sensitive to the mode of
competition, at least in the sense that the extreme case of identical products with Bertrand competition
and no trade costs leads to an indeterminate pattern of production and trade. However, the pro-
competition e¤ect is not at all sensitive; indeed it is stronger with Bertrand competition than with
Cournot, because even potential trade encourages the home rm to behave in a more competitive manner.
Another frequently-heard objection to oligopolistic trade models is the assumption of an exogenous
number of rms. This can be overcome by allowing entry. Indeed trade models with Cournot competition
and free entry have been developed (see for instance Venables (1985)) but these treat the number of
rms as a continuous variable. As a result, free entry ensures that there are zero prots in equilibrium.
Because these models ignore the so-called integer problem (the technical di¢ culties arising from the
requirement that the number of rms must be an integer), their predictions are similar to those from
models of monopolistic competition (or even perfect competition, if goods are homogeneous). If the
integer problem is not ignored, then prots continue to be earned in most equilibria and so the key
features of oligopoly survive. However, models incorporating these features have yet to be developed.37
For the present, a defence of the relevance of oligopolistic models with xed numbers of rms can fall
back on their realism in many real-world applications. Ignoring entry at least of large rms is very
plausible for the short run in most markets, and even over longer time horizons in many markets, where
the major players have shown great persistence over time, notwithstanding the spread of globalisation.
In conclusion, a key contribution of oligopoly in trade theory is its focus on central features of the
real world: the persistence of pure prots and the strategies adopted by rms to raise them. Indeed the
37Some possible approaches to this problem are sketched in Neary (2010).
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importance of prots can hardly be underestimated. They are key to the results of the reciprocal-markets
model, starting with the pathbreaking nding by Brander (1981) that intra-industry trade can arise from
rmsincentives to capture foreign monopoly rents. Prots are also the essential focus of strategic trade
policy, not in the sense that optimal policy necessarily implies prot-shifting towards domestic rms (for
example, if rms compete on price, then the optimal policy implies taxing a home rm which in e¤ect
shifts prots from it towards its foreign competitor), but rather that the motivation for policy arises from
the desire to raise prots net of taxes and subsidies, which in the third-market model is identical to social
welfare. Finally, in general equilibrium, the persistence of prots adds a new dimension to discussions
of income distribution: aggregate gains from trade can coexist with redistribution away from productive
factors (labour in our example) towards prot recipients.
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